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Payday Loan Regulation: Any Interest?
Chris Cirillo*
I. INTRODUCTION
Payday loans in their current form are relatively new to the con-
sumer credit industry. In their brief existence, however, their contro-
versial business model has attracted a large constituency of
opposition. The critics of payday loans cite stories of low-income bor-
rowers in desperate need of money who turned to payday loans only
to have their economic hardships exponentially increased by the in-
ability to pay back the payday loans. But the overall question re-
mains, Do the benefits of payday loans to society outweigh the
detriments? Perhaps a more important question, and the one this
Note addresses is, What regulations imposed upon payday lenders by
the state and federal government allow for a fair and mutually benefi-
cial relationship between the lender and the borrower. More specifi-
cally, Are interest rate maximums beneficial in an overall regulatory
scheme for payday loans? After all, as of the date of this Note, thirty-
two states statutorily authorize high-interest payday loans.' This im-
plicitly indicates that these states believe payday loans have the poten-
tial to benefit businesses and consumers through a balance of free
trade and consumer protection.
States attempt to achieve the optimal balance through different reg-
ulatory schemes that act in conjunction with federal regulations. One
of the specific regulations that payday loan critics push for as a neces-
sity to ensure consumer protection in all states is an interest rate cap
on payday loans.2 This Note demonstrates that an interest rate cap is
counterproductive to a regulatory scheme attempting to promote ben-
* BBA Finance University of Iowa, May 2010; JD DePaul University College of Law, May
2013. This Note is dedicated to my loving parents John and Carole Cirillo who made every one
of my life experiences, educational or otherwise, possible. I would also like to thank the BCLJ
staff and Board for their hard work and input, which were more directly focused on making this
Note possible.
1. Consumer Fed'n of Am., Legal Status of Payday Loans by State, PAYDAY LOAN CON-
SUMER INFo., http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/state-information (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
2. See Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MiNN. L.
REV. 1, 133 (2002); Uriah King & Leslie Parrish, Springing the Debt Trap: Rate Caps Are Only
Proven Payday Lending Reform, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 4 (2007), http://www.respon
siblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/springing-the-debt-trap.pdf.
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eficial access to payday loans. It also demonstrates that while certain
regulations are necessary to ensure fairness because of the payday
loan business model, an interest rate cap is an unnecessary fix to
problems plaguing the payday loan industry when better suited regu-
lations exist that protect borrowers and promote fairness. This Note
argues that the federal regulations currently in place, combined with
specific state regulations (absent interest rate caps), can provide a
beneficial and fair service to payday loan consumers if utilized in the
intended manner.
The central argument in this Note assumes that payday loans are
beneficial when used for their intended purpose.3 That intended pur-
pose is to quickly extend a small amount of credit, for a short time
period, to borrowers that do not qualify for other types of loans.4 The
presence of each portion of this intended purpose-quick, small
amount, short time period, specific borrower demographic-is essen-
tial to payday loans benefitting the borrower and the payday lender.
The speed of payday loans comes from a few factors, including that
borrowers should take a payday loan only for an emergency, a short-
term liquidity need, or an unexpected cost that typically involves a
time constraint.5 Due to this, the payday lender does not perform an
extensive credit check.6 Having a driver's license, home address, in-
come verification document, and checking account usually allows a
borrower to qualify for a payday loan.7
Offering only a small amount for the loan has two effects: (1) it
limits the probability that a borrower is unable to pay back the loan
on time, which would lead to accumulation of additional finance
charges and fines, and (2) it limits the lender's exposure to uncollecti-
ble losses. As mentioned, the short time period is an indicator that
the intention of these loans is not for long-term debt satisfaction. The
high interest rate becomes exponentially more burdensome as the
time period for the loan increases." This means that borrowers should
not use payday loans in a continuous or rollover manner. Unpaid bal-
ances should exist only for short periods of time. Finally, an accepted
conclusion is that payday lenders target borrowers that cannot obtain
3. Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 885 (2007).
4. See Edward C. Lawrence & Gregory Elliehausen, A Comparative Analysis of Payday Loan
Customers, 26 CowEMP. EcoN. POL'Y 299, 315 (2008).
5. See Chad A. Cicconi, A Role for Payday Lenders, 123 BANKING L.J. 235, 244-45 (2006).
6. Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 J. EcoN. PERSP. 169, 169 (2007).
7. Id.
8. See Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but
the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 214 (2008)
("[Miany short-term loans become expensive long-term debt service.").
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credit through another lending institution, but these are the borrowers
that are in need of credit, and payday lenders are actually safer in
terms of credit borrowing than many other subprime options. 9
II. BACKGROUND
The mechanics and the history of payday loans are the necessary
starting points to understand the payday loan. A payday loan is a
small, short-term, high interest loan that typically matures in two
weeks and is secured by the promise of the borrower's next
paycheck.' 0 Other terms for a payday loan include "cash advance
loans . . . post-dated check loans, delayed deposit checks, or deferred
deposit loans."" For purposes of this Note, all of these terms are in-
terchangeable, and payday loan is used most often. In a typical pay-
day loan, a borrower borrows a principal of less than $1,000.12 The
payday lender profits by charging interest during the loan period. At
the end of the period, the borrower pays back the principal. If left
unregulated, these interest charges can amount to annual percentage
rates (APRs) of triple digits.
The APR is the actual cost of borrowing expressed in a yearly per-
centage rate.' 3 Similar to the APR is a finance charge. A finance
charge is the amount in dollars that a borrower pays as interest ac-
cumulates on the principal.14 The interest rate is the percentage a
borrower charges (calculated by simple interest or precomputed inter-
est) on the principal. The difference between APR and interest rate is
that APR includes any additional fees or charges not included as
merely interest charged on the principal.' 5
The effect of payday loans on consumers is currently magnified be-
cause of the explosion of the payday lender in the 1990s.16 During the
1990s, demand for short-term credit skyrocketed, causing thousands
of payday lenders to enter the market. 7 Statistics from 2006 indicate
that payday lenders are one of the largest consumer credit services.
Over 15,000 payday loan stores exist, servicing loans that amount to
9. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 886-88.
10. DEE PRIDGEN & RicHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDrr AND THE LAw § 5:6
(2012).
11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Lawrence & Elliehausen, supra note 4, at 301.
13. BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 888 (9th ed. 2009).
14. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (2012).
15. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 10, § 6:9.
16. See Lawrence & Elliehausen, supra note 4, at 299.
17. Id.
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over $25 billion.18 As the practice of payday lending increased, so did
the abuse by both lenders and borrowers. States took notice of the
negative effects caused by the abuses and started to enact legislation
aimed at limiting the scope of potential harm and attempting to in-
form borrowers of the potential for harm. The federal government
also entered the legislation sphere with a focus on balancing the bar-
gaining power of the lender and borrower through complete and accu-
rate disclosures.' 9
Part 111(A) of this Note explores the federal regulation salient to
the issue addressed in this Note. Part III(B) compares two different
states' payday loan statutes to highlight the necessary components of
an effective statute and the broad range of interest regulations cur-
rently in effect. Part IV takes an economic analysis approach to pay-
day loans in general to show that an interest rate cap is unnecessary to
achieve what should be the desired goal of regulating payday loans.
Part V presents both a policy analysis that demonstrates that payday
loans are beneficial when used in the intended way and the potential
negative effects of an interest rate cap. Finally, Part VI suggests a
hypothetical regulatory scheme that best achieves the beneficial bal-
ance for which states, lenders, and consumers strive.
III. REGULATIONS
Payday loan regulations aim to protect consumers from entering po-
tentially hazardous loan agreements while still allowing for a benefi-
cial financial transaction. The most frequent complaints among
payday loan critics are that payday loans engage in predatory lending
by targeting desperate consumers who have no other options, payday
loan store customers sign loan agreements without knowing the essen-
tial terms, and the combination of these elements leads to the payday
loan customer becoming entrenched in a cycle of debt.20 Recently,
these critics have pushed for an interest rate cap on all payday loans as
the solution to these problems. The regulations analyzed below illus-
trate different examples of regulatory schemes, with and without the
use of interest rate caps, that attempt to promote the safe and benefi-
cial use of payday loans.
18. Id. at 299-300.
19. See generally id.
20. See generally Tom Lehman, In Defense of Payday Lending, THE FREE MKT. (Sept. 2003),
http://mises.org/freemarketdetail.aspx?control=454.
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A. Federal Regulations (TILA and Regulation Z)
The major federal regulation related to payday loans is the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA).21 Regulation Z is the regulation that imple-
ments TILA, and it contains most of the provisions referred to be-
low. 2 2 TILA and Regulation Z attempt to ensure that borrowers are
fully informed about any contract the borrower signs. The portions of
Regulation Z that are relevant to this Note are the disclosure require-
ments for closed-end credit transactions. 23 These requirements pro-
tect consumers by providing them with information from which they
can make an informed financial choice. 24
First, Regulation Z requires that the contract disclose both the
amount financed and a brief description of what this entails.25 Regu-
lation Z gives an example of a brief description of amount financed as
"the amount of credit provided to you or on your behalf." 26 This is a
threshold requirement that essentially ensures that a borrower re-
ceives the amount of money required to fulfill the obligation necessi-
tating the payday loan. Next, Regulation Z requires that the contract
disclose the finance charge and include a brief description such as "the
dollar amount the credit will cost you." 2 7 Also, Regulation Z requires
that the contract disclose the total payments.28 This disclosure illus-
trates the total amount a borrower will have paid when the borrower
has made all scheduled payments on the loan.2 9 Using only these dis-
closures, the borrower knows, or should know, the amount of money
loaned compared to the total amount that it will cost the borrower in
real dollars.
In addition, Regulation Z requires that a lender include the APR in
the contract and a description such as "the cost of ... credit as a yearly
rate."30 The consumer can use the APR to compare this loan contract
to another lender's loan offer based on a normalized rate that is uni-
formly calculated for all types of loans.3' Regulation Z also breaks
down individual sections of the loan for consumers to assess each por-
21. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. H§ 1601-1651 (2006).
22. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2012).
23. See generally id. §§ 226.17-226.18.
24. THOMAS A. DURKIN & GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, TRUTH IN LENDING: THEORY, HISTORY,
AND A WAY FORWARD 21 (2011).
25. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(b)-(c).
26. Id. § 226.18(b).
27. Id. § 226.18(d) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id. § 226.18(h).
29. Id.
30. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(e) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See DURKIN & ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 24, at 21 (noting that TILA allows borrowers to
compare APRs).
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tion related to their individual needs and capabilities. Regulation Z
requires that each loan contract contain a payment schedule that in-
cludes the number, amount, and timing of each payment.32 This at-
tempts to provide the borrower with a basic tool to assess its ability to
meet the obligations of the loan as scheduled.
In addition to the content requirements of Regulation Z, the disclo-
sures must also be in a form that ensures the consumer is made aware
of each. The first of these form requirements is that disclosures must
be in writing, in a form that the borrower can keep, and grouped to-
gether and segregated from everything else, and the itemization of
amount financed must be separate from other disclosures.33 The most
important cost disclosures, finance charges and APR, also must ap-
pear more conspicuously than the other disclosures.34 Lastly, in order
to dispel the notion that borrowers are unaware of any of these essen-
tial terms of the loan before agreeing to it, Regulation Z requires that
all of these disclosures appear before consummation of the loan.35
Taken together, these requirements rebut many of the assumptions
made by opponents of payday loans citing the dangers of a payday
loan that require an interest rate cap to correct. First, payday lenders
are not preying on the uninformed borrower who does not realize the
effect that a high interest loan will have on him financially. A bor-
rower is completely aware of the financial burden of the loan at the
time the borrower signs the loan contract. Regulation Z gives the bor-
rower every informational advantage by highlighting the essential
loan terms, defining them, and breaking down each variable to show
the financial effect as clearly as possible.36 The borrowers are in the
best position to assess their specific financial situation and, in particu-
lar, their ability to pay back the loan. A payday lender knows very
little about the income and expenses of each borrower because of the
limited credit check performed by the borrower, so the best thing a
lender can do is give the borrower full and specific information that
will give the borrower the tools to decide whether the benefits of a
particular loan outweigh the costs. 37
Of course, TILA's requirements, as implemented by Regulation Z,
are effective only if followed. Some proponents of an interest rate cap
cite that lenders do not follow TILA or borrowers ignore the TILA
32. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(g).
33. Id. § 226.17(a)(1).
34. Id. § 226.17(a)(2).
35. Id. § 226.17(b).
36. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
37. DURKIN & ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 24, at 21-22.
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disclosures as a reason to institute the interest rate cap and limit the
availability of payday loans.38 However, this argument is counterin-
tuitive; it advocates more regulation while positing that payday lend-
ers do not follow the existing regulations. An interest rate cap is just
as hard to enforce, if not more so, than disclosure requirements. If
lenders are willing to omit disclosures, manipulating interest calcula-
tions is not farfetched. A better solution is stricter enforcement and
harsher sanctions for violations of TILA. TILA allows for an in-
formed consumer to make an educated decision about his or her need
for a loan. An interest rate cap restricts a number of consumers from
obtaining a loan, effectively making that decision for them. 3 9
B. State Regulation
1. Delaware
Delaware is one of the least restrictive states regarding the treat-
ment of payday lenders. 40 The Delaware statute does not limit the
interest rate on a payday loan.41 It does, however, have a number of
functional restrictions. One is that a payday loan contract may rol-
lover only four times. 42 If a borrower cannot make a payment, the
borrower has the ability to extend or renew the loan by paying only
the finance charge on the date of maturity and leaving the principal to
rollover to another repayment period. However, Delaware allows
only four rollovers until the lender and the borrower must enter into a
repayment agreement, or the lender must pursue some other legally
available method to obtain payment from the borrower. 43 Another
consumer protection provision of the statute is that all payday loans
need to have a borrower right to rescission.44 This provision provides
to a borrower a reflection period to assess the loan transaction, and if
the borrower is not comfortable with it, the borrower can return the
amount financed and incur no additional costs. Finally, because critics
of payday loans also cite unfair and coercive collection practices by
payday lenders, Delaware codified a rule that discharges any person
38. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 13-18.
39. See infra Part IV.
40. As an initial matter, the state statute calls payday loans "short-term consumer loans," but
for continuity, the loans will still be referred to as payday loans here. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§ 2235A (West 2012).
41. Id. § 2235A(a).
42. Id. § 2235A(a)(1).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 2235A(a)(2).
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imprisoned for debt so that the threat of imprisonment is an empty
one.45
Delaware also expands on the TILA disclosure requirements by
mandating that the lender add three additional statements to every
loan contract. The first mandated disclosure is that "[t]he loan is de-
signed as a short-term cash flow solution and not designed as a solu-
tion for longer term financial problems." 46 This provision conveys the
intended purpose of payday loans as discussed above and warns a con-
sumer before they enter a loan contract. The second is that
"[a]dditional fees may accrue if the loan is rolled over." 47 This state-
ment indicates that borrowers find themselves in more financial dis-
tress as the amount of rollovers increases and attempts to guide
borrowers once they enter into a loan. Finally, Delaware requires
lenders to inform borrowers that "[c]redit counseling services are
available to consumers who are experiencing financial problems." 48
This provision attempts to inform a borrower that even if all of the
other safeguards did not prevent financial problems, the borrower is
not beyond help. Although each disclosure appears at the beginning
of the process, the content of each attempts to protect the borrower at
all stages of the loan.
The TILA disclosures make all essential components of the contract
easily and readily identifiable. The Delaware Code expands on this
and informs consumers of the intended uses for payday loans,49 what a
borrower should attempt to avoid once entering into a payday loan,50
and where to get help if the borrower falls into financial problems.51
All of these disclosures prevent a payday lender from taking advan-
tage of borrowers because the borrower benefits as levels of informa-
tion approach perfect information.52
The functional provisions in the Delaware statute work to protect
the payday loan borrower by limiting the negative financial effect
from using a payday loan in an unintended way, not by limiting access
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7301 (stating that "[w]hoever is imprisoned for debt, damages,
or costs, by virtue of any process or commitment, in a civil action (except process or commitment
of the Court of Chancery), having resided in this State for one year next preceding such impris-
onment, may obtain discharge from such imprisonment upon petition to the Superior Court of
the county wherein he or she is imprisoned, and compliance with the provisions of this
subchapter").
46. Id. § 2235A(b)(1).
47. Id. § 2235A(b)(2).
48. Id. § 2235A(b)(3).
49. Id. § 2235A(b)(1).
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2235A(b)(2).
51. Id. § 2235A(b)(3).
52. DURKIN & ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 24, at 24-25.
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to payday loans like an interest rate cap. The four rollover limit provi-
sion addresses the "spiral of debt" concern that interest rate cap pro-
ponents advance as a justification for limiting payday loans. Like the
other provisions, this does not limit the amount of interest and effec-
tively price potential borrowers out of a payday loan, but it does "cap"
the amount of interest that a borrower can accumulate by stopping
charges after four rollovers.
The difference between an interest rate cap and Delaware's rollover
limit is the point of restriction. Interest rate caps impose the restric-
tion at the point of access.53 The Delaware rollover provision restricts
at the point of financial hardship. If we accept that payday loans have
some benefit when used in the intended manner, allowing payday
loans and restricting the ability to use the loan in an unintended man-
ner that causes financial distress seems like a better avenue than re-
stricting access altogether. The borrower's right of rescission protects
against the abusive use of payday loans by recognizing that some bor-
rowers may disregard the warnings and, in desperation, take out a
loan without weighing the positives and negatives of the transaction. 54
Consumer rescission allows the borrower to reflect on the contract
possibly after the point of desperation.
If consumer protection starts with full and accurate disclosures in-
tended to prevent poor financial decisions, it ends with limiting the
consequences of making the poor financial decisions. Delaware ac-
complishes this through the section of the Delaware Code that re-
leases borrowers from imprisonment for debt.55 So, even after all the
protections discussed above regarding a borrower that cannot meet
his debt obligations, the borrower will not go to prison for debt.56
This is misunderstood in some contexts because the debt may be an
underlying reason for which some debtors go to prison.57 If a debtor
does not repay a loan, the lender can institute a civil action against the
debtor. The lender may then obtain a judgment against the debtor
ordering him to pay. If the debtor has the ability to pay, yet refuses to
do so, he may be arrested. The Delaware Code protects borrowers
from going to prison for having unpaid debt, not for refusing to follow
court orders.
53. See infra Part IV.
54. See Kelly D. Edmiston, Could Restrictions on Payday Lending Hurt Consumers?, FED.
RES. BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REV. 63, 69 (2011).
55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7301.
56. See Dealing with Payday Loan Collection Agencies, AciON PAYDAY LOANS (Nov. 4,
2008, 11:35 AM), http://www.actionpaydayloans.com/news/dealing-with-payday_1oancollection
.agencies.html.
57. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 89-90.
2013] 425
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The interest rate cap suggested by the opponents of payday loans is
an assertion that consumers are not able to make financially responsi-
ble decisions even with all relevant information and safeguard protec-
tions. The states that do not impose interest rate caps such as
Delaware find that consumers can make informed decisions but that
payday lenders have unequal bargaining power. Due to this inequal-
ity, states like Delaware add additional requirements to balance the
bargaining power of the lender and the borrower.
2. Texas
For a complete analysis, it is useful to compare Delaware's deferen-
tial restrictions of payday loans to a state with a more restrictive ap-
proach that includes interest rate caps. Texas is a good choice to
compare because states with interest rate caps lower than Texas usu-
ally impose the cap in order to cap payday lenders out of the market
completely rather than actually regulate operational stores.58 Some of
the functional requirements beyond an interest rate cap are that "[t]he
borrower must have a right to prepay the loan and redeem the check
at any time prior to the due date."59 Also, "[i]f the loan is prepaid in
full, the lender must refund any unearned finance charges," 60 and the
"lender must not keep borrower's postdated check for more than 31
days." 61
Additionally, Texas has some similar disclosure requirements to
Delaware and some additional disclosure requirements. One addi-
tional disclosure requirement in Texas is that "[t]he agreement must
also contain a notice of the name and address of the Office of Con-
sumer Credit Commissioner and the telephone number of the con-
sumer helpline." 62 Texas also has a provision that is similar to the
Delaware disclosure requirement about the intended use for a payday
loan. Texas requires that a lender disclose the following statement to
all potential payday loan borrowers: "This cash advance is not in-
tended to meet long-term financial needs. This loan should only be
used to meet immediate short-term cash needs. Renewing the loan
rather than paying the debt in full when due will require the payment
of additional charges." 63 Finally, Texas requires that the payday
58. See Consumer Fed'n of Am., Texas State Information, supra note 1.
59. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(e)(4) (2013).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 83.604(e)(5).
62. Id. § 83.604(e)(3).
63. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
PAYDAY LOAN REGULATION: ANY INTEREST?
lender post the fee schedule.64 The fee schedule is referred to as an
interest rate cap and is discussed further below.
The Texas payday loan statute states that a lender only "may charge
an amount that does not exceed the rates authorized in Texas Finance
Code, §§ 342.251-342.259."65 The statute includes a fee schedule that
outlines the finance charge and APR allowed based on the amount
financed and the term of the loan.6 6 Noticeably, the Texas statute
does not contain some of the consumer protection provisions that
Delaware enacted, arguably because Texas imposes an interest rate
cap instead.
One provision in the Texas statute explicitly excludes a limitation
on the amount of times that a lender can rollover a payday loan as
long as the interest does not exceed the amount authorized by the
statute.67 Texas's statute also does not contain a provision that allows
a borrower the right of rescission on the contract. The exclusion of
these two provisions supports the argument that Texas takes the ap-
proach of limiting the availability of payday loans instead of restrict-
ing the effects of the payday loan. Texas does not have the most
restrictive interest rate caps for the amount of interest a lender can
charge, but the fee schedule essentially takes any subjective analysis
by the lender or borrower out of the payday loan. The lack of a provi-
sion limiting rollovers leads to the conclusion that Texas also does not
believe rollovers are dangerous to payday borrowers because rol-
lovers do not harm borrowers or other safety provisions in the law
adequately protect the borrower. A fair conclusion is that Texas be-
lieves that the interest rate cap limits the potential dangers suffi-
ciently. The next section addresses the problem with this belief based
on economics and the benefits borrowers miss because of an interest
rate cap.
IV. ECONoMic ANALYSIS
An economic analysis of the payday loan model provides an addi-
tional justification that interest rate caps do not benefit the majority of
borrowers in the long run. The most basic analysis to start with is the
supply and demand for payday loans. A July 2004 study done by
64. 7 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(e)(6).
65. Id. § 83.604(c).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 83.604(f)(1) (stating that, "[a]lternatively, the payday loan or deferred presentment
transaction may be renewed without limitation to the number of renewals where the effect of the
total amount of the interest charge would not exceed the total amount authorized by Texas
Finance Code, § 342.252 and § 342.259 having due regard for the amount of the cash advance
and the time the cash advance is outstanding").
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Policis, an independent social and economic research group formed
for the public in the U.K., found uniform demand for credit across
low-income housing irrespective of the regulatory nature of terri-
tory.68 In the study, Policis surveyed U.S. states with and without in-
terest rate caps, as well as Germany, France, and the U.K., and found
that the demand for credit among low-income housing did not shift for
multiple forms of credit.69
However, interest rate caps do impact the supply side of payday
loans. A lender under a regulatory scheme that limits chargeable in-
terest with a cap will be unwilling to make a loan to the riskier con-
sumer unless the lender increases other charges because the lender
cannot compensate for the risk of default by raising the interest rate.
Thus, the supply side for low-income credit is reduced in areas with
interest rate caps.70
The Policis study suggests that some lenders shift costs from up
front interest to back-end ancillary charges when confronted with an
interest rate cap in order to make up for the lost interest.71 The study
indicated that the overall cost of credit as a percentage of the loan is
not affected in areas with interest rate caps, but as noted, the charges
are merely shifted to back-end costs. 72
As is the case in most industries with high demand that have a price
cap, the demand does not disappear when demand exceeds supply.
Those borrowers who are regulated or capped out of that market seek
similar substitute markets.73 This makes perfect sense in the area of
payday loans. For example, a low-income borrower experiences car
trouble and needs quick cash for the repair in order to get to work.
She lives in an interest rate capped area. She has poor credit and is
not able to obtain a payday loan because her risk of default to the
lender is too high for the lender to take a chance with a limit on the
amount of interest lenders are allowed to charge. Unfortunately, our
68. U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUS., THE EFFEcr OF INTEREST RATE CONTROLS IN OTHER
COUNTRIEs 10 (2004), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file53896.pdf.
69. Id. at 10-16.
70. Tom Lehman, Payday Lending and Public Policy: What Elected Officials Should Know 10
(Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.coalitionforfinancialchoice.org/
pdflPayday%20Lending%2OPublic%2OPolicy.PDF ("[L]egislated price ceilings and caps are a
prescription for disaster in any market because, to the extent that they are binding, they distort
prices and throw supply and demand into permanent disequilibrium. To put it less technically.
state regulations that hold finance charges on payday loans below the market-clearing level will
lead inevitably to an excess of demand over supply, creating shortages in the small loan market
and preventing marginal borrowers from obtaining credit in emergency situations.").
71. U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUS., supra note 68, at 24-25.
72. Id.
73. See Edmiston, supra note 54, at 80-82.
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hypothetical person's car troubles do not disappear. She must obtain
credit in some other way. A bank will not give her a loan because of
her poor credit. The most likely scenario is that she will seek out
other subprime credit options that are even less regulated. 7 4
Examples of less regulated subprime credit options include pawn-
shops, loan sharks, or "paying" with money she does not have-over
drafting, bouncing a check, or exceeding a credit card limit.75 All of
these come with substantial fees similar to those if the borrower de-
faults on a payday loan. However, for the most part, payday lenders
do not report defaults to credit agencies. 76 Therefore, if a payday
lender existed and was able to charge enough interest on a loan to the
hypothetical borrower, the borrower may be better off even if she de-
faults on the payday loan. In fact, a payday loan would have a better
chance of having no adverse consequences at all because the person
may be able to pay back the loan when her next paycheck comes, and
the only negative effect is the payment of interest that accrued during
the short period the loan was open.
A recent study suggested that the possible effects may be more than
just speculation. The study found that consumers in counties with re-
strictive payday lending statutes were more likely to have a lower
credit score than their counterparts in areas with less restrictive regu-
lations.77 The study performed a statistical regression that removed
other possible variables that impact credit rating, such as income and
employment numbers, and concluded that lack of access to payday
loans is statistically related to lower credit ratings.78
Logically, if a consumer is in need of credit, she can obtain it from a
payday lender, obtain it from another lender, or not obtain it. Reform
targeting payday loans must have the goal of either changing the rela-
tionship with the target-here, payday lenders-of the reform or
diverting the loan transactions from the target. Changing the relation-
ship with payday lenders through the use of interest rate caps limits
the supply of payday loans, which effectively diverts a segment of the
population to other lenders. The goal of interest-rate-cap advocates
must be to enable the consumer to use a safer, more equitable source
74. See id.
75. This is not to say that other options do not exist. Other options-such as payment plans
with creditors, credit union loans, advances from employers, emergency assistance programs-
exist; however, it is just as likely that these programs are not feasible because creditors are often
unwilling to enter the plans and employers are unwilling to advance the loans, so the speed and
convenience of payday loans make them the best option.
76. See Edmiston, supra note 54, at 72.
77. Id. at 76.
78. Id. at 77.
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of credit or not get the credit at all. So, if the regulation achieves that
goal there would be greater use of safer and more equitable "main-
stream credit" in areas with payday loan restrictions compared to ar-
eas without restrictions; however, no increase in the use of
mainstream credit would indicate that consumers are resorting to less
credible lenders or not getting the credit at all.
This hypothesis was tested, and the results indicated that borrowers
in areas that impose interest rate caps borrow slightly less from main-
stream credit providers.79 This is the opposite of what an interest rate
cap seeks to accomplish. The difference between the areas is not sta-
tistically significant, so it is essentially no different, but that still means
that those borrowers capped out of the payday loan market did not
substitute the safer mainstream credit providers for payday loans.80
No data exists that measures the subprime lender market accurately
enough to know what sources of credit low-income borrowers re-
sorted to without access to payday loans. The two possibilities are
that the low-income borrowers did not obtain the credit they needed,
or the borrowers sought credit from another type of creditor. States
must decide whether payday loans are more dangerous than borrow-
ers defaulting on other obligations or resorting to other subprime
forms of credit; regardless, strong support exists for allowing access to
payday loans.
V. POLICY
To some, the most objectionable portion of a payday loan is the idea
that payday lenders can charge sky-high interest in order to profit as
much as they please because the payday loan user's demand is so
great that the lenders have enough bargaining power to charge an un-
reasonable amount. However, this policy argument-that payday
lenders should not be able to profit exponentially at the expense of
desperate borrowers-is not supported by the lender's cost to revenue
ratio of providing such a loan. Ernst & Young recently performed a
study for the Financial Services Center of America (FiSCA) that sur-
veyed a variety of multiline stores-stores that offered more than just
payday loans-for their financial information during 2008-2009 in or-
der to figure out the costs and revenues of conducting business.8' The
study found that the average cost for a lender to provide a payday
79. See id. at 80.
80. See id.
81. See The Cost of Providing a Payday Loan in a US Multiline Operator Environment, ERNST
& YOUNG, 1-6 (Sept. 2009), http://www.fisca.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Resources/ForMedia
Policymakers/InformationKit/FiSCAFinal_09.03.09_SenttoClient.pdf.
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loan to a customer was $13.89 per $100 payday loan. 82 Additionally,
the study found that the average revenue generated by the payday
loan was $15.26 per $100 payday loan, making for a pretax profit of
$1.37.83 Additionally, the study found that the average amount fi-
nanced for a payday loan was $379, the average cost of making a $379
payday loan was $52.63, and the average revenue was $57.85, making
for a pretax profit of $5.22 per $379 loan.84
The $15.26 of revenue produced from a $100 loan indicates a loan
with an APR of close to 400%.85 Even assuming that the payday
lender collects on every loan that would drive the lender's bad debt
cost down to zero in the study, the cost of making the payday loan is
still $10.15, which the payday lender essentially "sells" for $15.26.
This assumption removes the argument that payday lenders increase
their own cost by providing a loan that is too costly to pay back. The
resulting $5.11 pretax profit is hardly something that needs a realloca-
tion of bargaining power through the use of an interest rate cap.
One further point on APR is that it may be misleadingly high to the
casual observer because consumers are more familiar with long-term
loans. A typical payday loan, used for ease of analysis, is a two-week
$100 loan with a $15 interest charge. 6 So ultimately, the borrower
will borrow $100 and pay $115 back to the lender in two weeks. This
yields an APR of 391%. If the borrower analyzing the loan looks only
at the loan amount and APR, the loan appears to be outrageous.
However, a $15 charge that can be paid back in two weeks is not as
outrageous as it appears. Anyone with a debit card that has incurred
an ATM transaction fee may be surprised by a comparison. A simple
calculation will show why.
The typical payday loan APR is calculated by (1) dividing the fi-
nance charge by the amount financed, (2) multiplying by the number
of days in a year, (3) dividing by the term of the loan, and, finally, (4)
multiplying by 100 to show the number in percentage form. In the
example above, the calculation would go as follows: finance charge =
$15; amount financed = $100; number of days in a year = 365; and
term of loan = 14 days.
$15/$100 = .15
.15 * 365 days = 54.75
82. Id. at 19.
83. Id. at 23-24.
84. Id. at 25.
85. See infra Part V (discussing how to calculate APR).
86. See, e.g., Alex Gomory, Payday Loans vs. Installment Loans, LOANS.ORG (Dec. 12, 2011,
11:08 AM), http://loans.org/payday/articles/payday-vs-installment.
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54.75/14 days = 3.91
3.91 * 100 = 391% APR
Compare this to the simple debit card fee that millions of people
experience. If a person withdraws $50, $50 is the amount financed. In
this hypothetical, the finance charge is a $1 transaction fee. The with-
drawer obviously pays it when the transaction occurs so the term is
one day. If the transaction fee is considered an interest charge, the
premise being that interest on a loan is a cost to have access to liquid-
ity, and a debit fee also is a liquidity cost, What would the APR be?
Here is the calculation:
$1/$50 = .02
.02 * 365 = 7.3
7.3/1 = 7.3
7.3 * 100 = 730% APR
The calculation above illustrates that it is important to keep per-
spective when analyzing the numbers. The $1 withdrawal fee does not
seem as objectionable as the hypothetical APR. The APR is inflated
largely due to the one-day period. Similarly, although the APR calcu-
lation for a payday loan seems high, it is deceptive to those accus-
tomed to viewing interest in longer terms. Also, APR is largely
irrelevant to borrowers compared to the actual dollar cost8 7 If pay-
day loans work in their most mechanical manner, a borrower borrows
$100 today for an emergency and writes a postdated check for $115
dated for the maturity of the loan. The borrower gets paid from work
sometime within the next week or two. At the end of the loan term,
the payday lender will cash the check, which will decrease the bor-
rower's recently increased checking account.
The cause of concern for most opponents is that not all loans end up
working this way, and much of their argument against payday loans
with unlimited interest charges is policy driven on the premise that
unlimited interest hurts borrowers.88 The counterargument to this
concern is to analyze whether an interest rate cap is an effective solu-
tion.89 This analysis is still based on empirical data and theory, but it
combines different points of analysis to hypothesize the outcome.
The economics of payday loans indicate that capping interest rates
limits the supply of loans.90 A good illustration of this is New York,
87. Lehman, supra note 70, at 9.
88. See id. at 12.
89. See id. at 9-10.
90. See id. at 10.
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where state regulation caps interest for payday loans at 25%.91 Not
one payday lender exists in New York.92 This supports the theory that
capping interest at a low enough rate will effectively eliminate all will-
ing suppliers from the market. North Carolina and Georgia are two
other states that have no payday lenders. Although Georgia elimi-
nated payday loans through statute,93 and North Carolina effectively
eliminated payday loans through restrictions including capping inter-
est,94 this does not affect the analysis. The mechanism for eliminating
payday loans is not important to this portion of the analysis because
the comparison of limiting the supply of payday loans through an in-
terest rate cap and eliminating them through some other avenue
leaves at least some segment of consumers in the same position-
without access to a payday loan.
Daniel P. Morgan and Michael R. Strain researched the effects of
the payday loan ban in Georgia and South Carolina in depth with
their article, Payday Holiday: How Households Fare After Payday
Credit Bans.95 Their findings showed overall increases in North Caro-
lina and Georgia for bounced checks, complaints to the Federal Trade
Commission about lenders and debt collectors, and Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy filings compared to households in states that allow payday
lending.96 They concluded that the negative correlation-a decrease
in reduced payday credit options increases credit problems-does not
support the hypothesis that payday loans with high interest rates cause
borrowers to fall into a spiral of debt, but it does support the idea that
payday loans are a preferable substitute to other subprime options
that increase credit issues.97 The study also compared the numbers for
each state pre-payday loan ban (Georgia, May 2004; North Carolina,
December 2005) and post-payday loan ban.98 It found that consumers
were worse off after the payday loan ban in both states using three
91. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2012). Although New York has no statute spe-
cifically addressing payday loans, section 190.40 criminalizes collecting interest on any loan ex-
ceeding 25% APR. Id.
92. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 879-80.
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-1(e) (West 2012).
94. See Consumer Fed'n of Am., supra note 1 ("Payday lending is not specifically authorized
and is defacto prohibited by several state small loan rate caps. These states include . . . North
Carolina .... ).
95. See generally Donald P. Morgan & Michael R. Strain, Payday Holiday: How Households
Fare After Payday Credit Bans (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Reports No. 309, Nov. 2007),
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff-reports/sr309.pdf.
96. Id. at 3.
97. See id. at 21-22.
98. Id. at 10, 21-22.
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indicators: bounced checks (and fees), complaints to the FTC about
lenders, and bankruptcy filings.99
The Morgan and Strain article analyzed what effect the lack of pay-
day loans had on those missing an obligation to pay by measuring the
amounts of complaints filed with the FTC for reasons related to what
they call "informal bankruptcy" or the effects of not making payment
on debt. 00 The data supports the finding that after payday loan bans
in Georgia, complaints to the FTC substantially increased.' 0 ' In-
cluded in the complaints measured were complaints against lenders
and debt collectors.102 With fewer lenders in the market, the logical
effect is that complaints against lenders would decrease, especially if
the lenders regulated out of the market were harmful to borrowers.
However, the study found that complaints increased even after con-
trolling for unemployment, which means the strength of the state's
economy was not a factor in the analysis. 03 The fact that complaints
increased against lenders and debt collectors from the year prior to
the payday loan ban to the year after the ban indicates that borrowers
were actually more frustrated with credit facilities after the removal of
the predatory payday lender.
The best way to regulate payday lenders for borrowers and lenders
is still a highly contested issue, and obviously the lack of uniformity
across state regulations indicates that state governments do not agree.
Instead of merely critiquing regulations that do not work in the next
section, this Note suggests what regulations would work. In doing so,
this Note outlines a hypothetical payday loan regulatory structure that
has the best chance of benefitting all interested parties.
VI. SUGGESTED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
As an initial matter, this Note accepts that TILA is beneficial in a
payday lending regulatory scheme and incorporates all of the TILA
requirements as a necessity. It is also important to keep in mind the
effects that these regulations should aspire to have when considering a
new framework. The regulations need to balance keeping the cost of
conducting business for the payday lender at a level where it operates
99. See id. at 21-22.
100. Morgan & Strain, supra note 95, at 15-21. The authors of the study make three argu-
ments for why FTC complaints are a good measure for the effects: (1) complaints measure wel-
fare because, for the most part, a borrower will only complain when pushed to a certain extent
that the borrower would otherwise not reach; (2) monthly data makes a specific event's effect
more measurable; and (3) it is intuitive that complaints equate to problems. Id. at 16.
101. See id. at 15-17.
102. Id. at 17.
103. See id. at 23.
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profitably while lending to economically stable borrowers and limiting
the possibility of harm to the borrower.104 Essentially, the regulations
need to make payday loans beneficial to lenders and borrowers, not a
one-sided affair for either. The regulatory framework this Note sug-
gests as the best way to achieve this balance is an approach that makes
both a quick, individualized assessment of the costs and benefits of
payday loans by the borrower and the lender prior to the loan and a
debt safety net after the lender makes the loan.
The proposed regulatory scheme below differs from an interest rate
cap by using specific criteria to determine which borrowers should
have access to payday loans. The regulations differ from an interest
rate cap because, instead of either eliminating a category of borrowers
from the market or shifting revenue from interest payments to other
fees, 05 the proposed scheme allows the borrower and the lender to
make a greater specific, personalized inquiry into whether the payday
loan is beneficial while not substantially raising the cost of making the
loan for the lender. The borrower's assessment of whether a payday
loan is worthwhile depends heavily on the question, Can I pay this
loan back according to these terms? The factors that bear on the an-
swer to this question are the terms of the loan and the borrower's
specific financial situation, which are what the regulatory scheme aims
to determine in an efficient and effective manner.
This scheme starts by providing the borrower with full and accurate
disclosures to increase the accuracy of the borrower's personal assess-
ment of whether the loan is beneficial for the borrower, which TILA
effectively does,10 6 and adds additional informational safeguards to
provide a low-cost benefit to potential borrowers; thus, this regulatory
framework would include additional disclosure requirements, similar
to Delaware's requirements.1 0 7 The additional disclosures by Dela-
ware inform consumers of the intended uses for payday loans, how to
handle a payday loan in the most beneficial manner, what to avoid
once entering into a payday loan, and where to get help if the bor-
rower falls into financial problems.108
104. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 1011, 1021(a), 1031(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1963, 1979, 2005 (2010) (codified in scattered sections
of the U.S. Code) (establishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, stating that its pur-
pose is to ensure fair practices for consumers, and defining unfair practices as practices that are
"likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers"
or where "such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or
to competition").
105. See supra Part IV.
106. See, e.g., DURIN & ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 24, at 211; see also supra Part III(A).
107. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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In addition to TILA, another pre-loan regulation should require
that lenders make an individualized assessment of each borrower, on a
limited scale, through specific screening measures such as income ver-
ification. TILA and income verification allow the borrower and
lender to assess the financial position of a potential borrower; how-
ever, in the payday loan market, specific financial obligations also
have a large impact on the effectiveness of the loan. In order to pre-
vent a payday loan from being used in an unintended and potentially
harmful manner, a payday loan statute should have pre- and post-loan
provisions that specifically address these potentially negative conse-
quences. Two effective pre-loan provisions are a limit on the number
of outstanding payday loans a borrower may have and a limit on the
total number of payday loans a borrower may take out in a calendar
year.
These preemptive pre-loan measures, while effective, are not per-
fect. 109 A complete payday loan statute should also include post-loan
regulations that are reactive to potentially harmful situations. The
most concerning negative consequence is a borrower falling into a
debt spiral.110 An effective regulation that could limit the spiral's
magnitude is a restriction on the number of rollovers for a loan be-
cause it effectively cuts off the cycle of over-leveraging before it be-
comes uncontrollable.
The disclosure requirements allow the borrower to make a personal
assessment of whether the loan is right for his specific situation by
disclosing the terms and allowing the borrower to apply the obliga-
tions imposed by the terms to the borrower's financial situation."'
However, it is well documented that some of these borrowers will act
irrationally and not make the best decision for their situation,112 so the
lender also must engage in a limited individual assessment of the bor-
rower's ability to repay the loan through the use of income verifica-
tion and an assessment of other loan obligations. Finally, if these
initial screening mechanisms fail, the best way to limit the damage is
to prevent excessive rollovers. The regulatory structure that follows
assumes TILA requirements are in place and also incorporates the
Delaware disclosure requirements.
109. DURKIN & ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 24, at 212.
110. See Carmen M. Butler & Niloufar A. Park, Mayday Payday: Can Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility Save Payday Lenders?, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL'Y 119, 121-24 (2006).
111. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (2012) ("The purpose of this regulation is to promote the in-
formed use of consumer credit by requiring disclosures about its terms and cost.").
112. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 55
(2008).
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A. Income Verification
Once the borrower is fully informed about the obligations and char-
acteristics of the loan through the TILA and Delaware disclosures, a
lender should assess the ability of the borrower to repay the loan. As
previously stated, the intention of the loan is to be a quick and easy
way to obtain credit, so a full blown credit check is counterproductive.
A quick and simple analysis of whether a borrower can meet his obli-
gations is based upon the difference between a borrower's income and
expenses.
An effective way to insure that a borrower has enough incoming
cash flow is through an income verification mechanism. For example,
the Illinois payday lending statute achieves this through requiring a
payday lender to obtain income verification from a borrower that
shows documented income from the last thirty days.113 The statute
does not directly state this, but the statute limits the amount a lender
can loan to borrowers based on their "gross monthly income," 114 and
the statute defines gross monthly income as "monthly income as
demonstrated by official documentation of the income, including, but
not limited to, a pay stub or a receipt reflecting payment of govern-
ment benefits, for the period 30 days prior to the date on which the
loan is made."115
A short income verification process, such as that required by Illi-
nois, adds negligible cost to the lender and is one safeguard that in-
creases the probability that the borrower has an income source that
will allow the borrower to pay back the loan.116 Although this provi-
sion may seem duplicative because the term payday loan assumes that
a borrower is getting a paycheck to turn over to the lender at the end
of the loan, requiring the borrower to prove and the lender to verify
that the borrower does in fact have income, it should not be over-
looked. This regulation restricts access to payday loans to those that
have the ability to pay lenders back because borrowers have periodic
access to cash.
B. Outstanding and Yearly Loan Limits
The payday loan statute should also address specific cash outflows
through a limit on the number of payday loans a borrower may obtain
at a given time and in a given year. The Ohio payday loan statute
113. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 122/1-10, 2-5(e)(2) (West 2012).
114. Id. § 2-5(e)(2).
115. Id. § 1-10.
116. See, e.g., Applying BI to Payday Lending Regulatory Solutions, VERITEC, http://www.veri
tecs.com/PaydaySolution.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
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does both. Ohio requires that a lender verify that the borrower does
not have any other payday loans outstanding"'7 and that a borrower
may take out a total of only four payday loans in a calendar year."i8
The latter provision is one that not many other states impose as a
restriction, but makes logical sense to promote the beneficial and in-
tended use of a payday loan because payday loans are not intended to
meet recurring obligations, and limiting the number per year prevents
this type of recurring use.
In order for a lender to check the borrower's payday loan history,
all payday lenders must engage in recordkeeping that shares data with
the other lenders in the state. This requirement is already in place in
thirteen states through the use of the Veritec database.119 Veritec is a
database accessible by all payday lenders in those states, and it allows
payday lenders to input and look up data on payday borrowers. States
that require lenders to input all payday loans into the Veritec database
typically require that the lender input the identifying criteria of a bor-
rower, 120 the loan terms, and the date of the loan.121 The lender re-
quires this information anyway in order to make the loan, so inputting
this into a shared database adds minimal inconvenience to the lender
and produces expansive bookkeeping benefits. States that require
lenders to use the Veritec database allow lenders and regulatory agen-
cies to pull up information on a borrower within seconds by signing
into a password-protected account and simplify lenders' compliance
with the limitations on outstanding and yearly loans.122
In order for the lender to comply with the proposed regulations, the
lender needs to simply identify the borrower, bring up the borrower's
transactions from the database, and then check if the borrower has
any other open payday loans or has taken out a payday loan more
than four times within the last year. This regulation and accompany-
ing database entry requirement restricts access to payday loans from
those that use payday lending in an improper and financially danger-
ous manner.
117. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.41(E) (West 2012).
118. Id. § 1321.41(R).
119. See Collaborative Government Solutions, supra note 116 (listing collaborations with state
agencies in Illinois, Wisconsin, Virginia, Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, New
Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Washington on tracking payday or simi-
larly defined loans).
120. Examples include name, birthdate, social security number, address, and phone number.
121. See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 122/2-15 (West 2012).
122. See Applying BI to Payday Lending Regulatory Solutions, supra note 116.
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C. Rollover Limits
The final component of this regulatory framework is a ban on rol-
lovers to prevent a borrower from the "debt cycle." The opponents of
payday loans cite the idea that a borrower may not rollover a current
loan but can take out a new loan to repay the old one as a loophole
that payday lenders use to circumvent a rollover ban and entrap their
borrowers in a debt cycle. 123 This of course fails to take into account
regulatory schemes, such as the one proposed, that have built-in pro-
tection against this by limiting the number of outstanding payday
loans a borrower may have at any one given time. Using the danger
of a debt cycle as the justification of an interest rate cap takes into
account too many assumptions that may or may not be true. 124 The
justification goes like this: payday loan users are low-income borrow-
ers that have limited excess capital to pay these unlimited interest
charges on payday loans, so they default on the loan, rollover the loan,
thereby accruing more interest, and are unable to pay that when it
comes due.125 This debt cycle has no end because the borrower is
never able to repay the charges from the previous period.126
Instead of assuming that uncapped interest rates will lead to the
debt cycle, limiting the amount of rollovers stops the cycle by restrict-
ing the amount of rollovers. In this situation the charges stop. In fact,
a recent study performed by Marc Anthony Fusaro and Patricia J. Ci-
rillol 27 found that the levels of interest on payday loans had no rela-
tion to the ability of a borrower to pay back a loan.128 The study
tracked payday loans given to borrowers that carried no interest
charge and those with normal high interest rates, and found that the
ability of borrowers to repay the loan was not dependent on the
APR.129 Their conclusion was that the amount of rollovers a bor-
rower uses is based on factors other than the interest rate, which
means regulating the interest rate does not limit rollovers.o30
123. See Rollover Bans Don't Stop Payday Trap, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Apr. 9,
2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/media-center/press-releases/archives/rollover-bans-don
-t-stop-payday-trap.html.
124. See, e.g., Donald Rieck, "Predatory Reporting" on Payday Lending?, STATS, http://stats.
org/stories/2008/how.bad-paydayjoansjulyl8_08.html (last updated July 21, 2008).
125. King & Parrish, supra note 2, at 7-8.
126. Id.
127. No relation to the author of this Note.
128. See Marc Anthony Fusaro & Patricia J. Cirillo, Do Payday Loans Trap Consumers in a
Cycle of Debt? 28-30 (Nov. 16, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at ssrn.comlabstract=
1960776.
129. See id. at 22, 27.
130. See id. at 28.
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Although an interest rate cap does not stop a cycle of debt, a well-
crafted rollover limit will. An example of a rollover limit that
achieves this is the Alabama statute, which requires that the outstand-
ing balance of a loan be paid after the initial loan period and limits a
borrower to a maximum of one rollover. 131 This requirement effec-
tively stops debt from accruing after a maximum of one rollover. If
the borrower cannot repay the outstanding balance in full, the payday
lender has the option of offering the borrower an extended repayment
option of four equal monthly installments of the remaining balance.132
This restriction takes into account events that occur over the span of
the loan and acts as a stopgap to the flood gates of insurmountable
debt without assuming what will occur. A well-crafted rollover limit,
such as the one utilized in Alabama, effectively prevents the debt cy-
cle from occurring, not an interest rate cap as illustrated by the Fusaro
and Cirillo study.
VII. CONCLUSION
If one thing is clear about the current state of payday loans, it is that
most borrowers and regulators do not agree about the best way to
deal with them. State regulations range from completely banning pay-
day loans to imposing little more than the federal disclosure require-
ments on payday lenders. The disagreement may not be settled
anytime soon because it comes down to balancing the limitations of
the potential harm and the maximum potential benefit; the outcome
depends on too many factors for a one-size-fits-all regulatory struc-
ture. Interest rate caps undoubtedly limit the potential harm to bor-
rowers but do so at the expense of the benefits the loans provide
them. Although the regulatory structure suggested above may not be
perfect, the economics and policies supported by studies indicate that
it has a better chance of providing benefits and limiting danger than
an interest rate cap.
131. ALA. CODE § 5-18A-12(b) (LexisNexis 2013).
132. Id. § 5-18A-12(c).
